In this paper we investigate the effect of offshore supply dependence (OSD) on offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons. We find that OSD hampers a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness to demand information updates and may significantly affect offshoring-reshoring comparisons, such that reshoring may yield lower profits than offshoring in many cases, including when offshoring has no baseline-cost advantage. We then show that OSD also affects how salient costs such as customs duties and shipping costs influence offshoringreshoring profit comparisons. We further identify common-component designs as a mitigating measure to make reshoring more appealing under OSD, and numerically confirm the robustness of our results.
Introduction
For nearly three decades, offshoring has been the predominant trend of the US manufacturing industry. The top driver of this trend is the substantially lower labor costs in emerging economies.
Recently, this labor arbitrage has been gradually tapering off as wages in developing economies such as China and India increase by 10-20% annually, putting a spotlight on the drawbacks of offshoring, including shipping costs and lead-times, lost manufacturing expertise, potential intellectual property leakage, increased disruption risks, and political pressure (The Economist 2013).
Accordingly, a growing number of US-based companies started to consider bringing factories back to the US-dubbed reshoring-and some have taken actions. In December 2013, Apple announced that they had started producing the Mac Pro computers in a Texas plant as part of a US$100 million Made-in-the-USA push (Burrows 2013) . Google also assembled its Moto X smartphones in the US and heavily advertised this initiative (King 2013) . However, the adoption of reshoring has been slower than many have hoped, generating much discussion (Schoenberger 2013) . Practitioners' views on whether reshoring is viable and scalable are divided (Hertzman 2014 , Wang 2014 .
Despite rapidly shrinking cost differences between offshoring and reshoring, labor costs are still the top driver of manufacturers' global supply chain re-structuring decisions, according to recent surveys by Chen et al. (2015) of a large number of multi-national companies. Taking the cost consideration one step further, a Boston Consulting Group (BCG) report argues that when making supply chain re-structuring decisions, "companies should undertake a rigorous, product-by-product analysis of their global supply networks that fully accounts for total costs, rather than just factory wages" (Sirkin et al. 2011) . Indeed, researchers have rigorously analyzed issues beyond direct cost comparisons. A notable example is responsiveness (Donohue 2000 , Wang et al. 2014 , Wu and Zhang 2014 . The common notion is that reshoring reduces the products' shipping lead-times and allows production decisions to be postponed based on more accurate demand information. However, the above notion about reshoring's superior responsiveness ignores the potential issue of limited onshore supply availability-which makes frequent appearances in practitioners' discussions about reshoring. Chen et al. (2015) and Cohen et al. (2016) 's survey respondents rate supply availability to be among top drivers of multi-national companies' supply chain re-structuring decisions. The BCG report by Sirkin et al. (2011) lists well-developed supply networks as one of China's strengths as an offshoring destination. A New York Times article (Duhigg and Bradsher 2012) also depicts the superior supply availability in China's iPhone supply chain: "You need a thousand rubber gaskets? That's the factory next door. You need a million screws? That factory is a block away." On the other hand, during the long-lasting offshoring movement, onshore supply bases have gradually withered as manufacturing moved overseas (The Economist 2014). Shih (2014) summarizes, "Over time, China-based manufacturers localized their supply chains...For industries such as electronics...moving production back to a country such as the United States therefore often means a manager will face a hollowed-out supply base." In fact, Google's "made in the USA" Moto X smartphone was revealed to contain components that mostly came from overseas (King 2013) .
The above evidence suggests that many firms, should they choose to reshore manufacturing, would continue depending on offshore suppliers until the reemergence of full-fledged onshore supply bases. Such offshore supply dependence (OSD) may potentially undermine a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness. We explained earlier that, assuming perfect onshore supply availability, reshoring reduces product shipping lead-times and allows production decisions to be postponed based on more accurate demand information. However, under OSD, while reshoring can reduce finished product shipping lead-times, it would at the same time increase material and component shipping lead-times; therefore, while production decisions are postponed, component purchase decisions are not. As a result, OSD hampers a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness to demand information updates. In addition, OSD also implies that a reshoring manufacturer still needs to engage in cross-border transactions for components. Accordingly, expenses such as customs duties and shipping costs remain relevant to reshoring manufacturer under OSD.
In this paper, we seek to answer three main research questions. First, how does OSD affect a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness to demand information updates and impact offshoringreshoring profit comparisons? Second, how do salient costs of cross-border transactions such as customs duties and shipping costs influence offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons under OSD?
Third, what mitigating measures could one take to make reshoring more appealing under OSD?
To address these research questions, we consider a manufacturer whose factory converts components sourced offshore into finished goods to meet random onshore demands. The factory may be either close to the supplier under offshoring or close to the market under reshoring. There are two decision stages. Under offshoring, the offshore production decision precedes the finished good shipping decision, whereas under reshoring with OSD, the components shipping decision is followed by the onshore production decision. We assume that more accurate demand information will be revealed between the two decision stages through certain marketing events (Fisher and Raman 1996) . Note that demand information updates typically come from marketing departments and thus are not affected by where products are manufactured; what is different between offshoring and reshoring is how the manufacturer can respond to such information updates. In particular, an offshoring manufacturer may either adjust the inventory level upward by rushing a production order before shipping (without worrying about component supply), or adjust it downward by not shipping all finished goods. By contrast, a reshoring manufacturer under OSD may either adjust the inventory level upward by expediting more components from offshore before production begins, or adjust it downward by not processing all shipped components into finished goods.
To demonstrate the effect of OSD, we first introduce a benchmark case where OSD is ignored, namely the reshoring manufacturer has access to unlimited onshore component supply with negligible lead-time. Reflecting the current industry reality, we analyze the benchmark model (as well as all other models throughout this paper) on the premise that offshoring has equal or lower"baselinecost" than reshoring, namely offshoring's unit cost of goods sold under regular operations is equal to or lower than reshoring. Our analysis reveals a basic tradeoff between offshoring's baseline-cost advantage and reshoring's responsiveness advantage which is well documented in the literature (Wang et al. 2014, Wu and Zhang 2014) . In particular, when offshoring has no baseline cost advantage, reshoring ignoring OSD dominates offshoring due to its responsiveness advantage.
We then show how OSD significantly cripples reshoring's responsiveness advantage, revealing new insights into the cost-responsiveness tradeoff between offshoring and reshoring. Under OSD, reshoring's responsiveness advantage is determined by the costs of (OSD-related) inventory adjustments after demand information updates. Specifically, the upward and downward-adjustment costs under OSD are the costs of expedited shipping and discarded components, respectively. We show that when the expedited shipping cost (upward-adjustment cost) is relatively low, the offshoringreshoring comparison retains the same structure as when OSD is ignored, with a shrinking reshoring region (as one would expect). However, when the expedited shipping cost is relatively high, OSD drastically alters the structure of the offshoring-reshoring comparison. In particular, if the discarded component cost is also relatively high, reshoring under OSD can be dominated by offshoring, yielding the most striking contrast to when OSD is ignored. In this case, reshoring's upward and downward adjustments are both costly, which completely wipe out reshoring's responsiveness advantage over offshoring. Therefore, ignoring OSD may exaggerate reshoring's responsiveness advantage, leading to misguided favorable predictions about reshoring, while in fact the opposite may be true should OSD be properly accounted for.
We next investigate how salient costs of cross-border transactions such as customs duties and shipping costs affect offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons under OSD. We find that increasing customs duties may or may not make reshoring more appealing, and higher shipping costs for both finished goods and components can make reshoring less appealing when compared with offshoring.
Both observations are more nuanced than the common notions formed without accounting for OSD, signifying the importance of considering OSD when comparing offshoring and reshoring.
To help mitigate OSD's hampering effect on reshoring's responsiveness, we propose a simple approach, namely common-component designs. If a reshoring manufacturer implements commoncomponent designs in its product family, it can pool component purchases for multiple products and later allocate the components among products after learning more accurate demand information, thus improving its responsiveness. By contrast, an offshoring manufacturer would benefit little from such an approach, because it already has unlimited component supply due to being close to its supplier. As a result, common-component designs make reshoring under OSD more appealing.
In addition, we numerically confirm the robustness of our results through two model extensions.
In the first extension, we generalize the two-point demand prior considered in our main model to a continuous demand prior. In the second extension, we allow for using existing components or finished goods to satisfy unmet demand after demand realization, via rush production or expedited shipping. In both extensions the main model's predictions remain structurally unchanged.
In summary, to our knowledge, this paper is the first to rigorously model and investigate the effect of OSD on reshoring manufacturing. We show that OSD hampers reshoring's responsiveness, reshaping the cost-responsiveness tradeoff between offshoring and reshoring and significantly affecting offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons. Failing to account for OSD may lead to false optimism about reshoring, and thus OSD deserves careful attention of relevant stakeholders in the consideration of reshoring. In fact, the recent empirical study by Cohen et al. (2016) finds that firms which choose to reshore tend to have less concerns about supply-related factors including supply availability and raw material and logistics costs, which is consistent with our model predictions.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. A literature review is provided in Section 2. We model and formulate the offshoring and reshoring problems in Section 3, and compare them to reveal main insights about the effect of OSD in Section 4. We then discuss the influence of customs duties and shipping costs, a mitigating measure for OSD, as well as two robustness checks in Section 5. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6. Online Appendix A contains additional analyses, and Online Appendix B contains all proofs.
Literature review
In this paper we compare reshoring to offshoring. A related concept to offshoring is outsourcing.
Tsay (2014) provides a lucid delineation between offshoring and outsourcing. Here is an excerpt from p. 129 of his monograph: "The hazards of both offshoring and outsourcing can be interpreted as losing proximity, i.e., the creation of distance. In the case of outsourcing, the distance is organizational in nature. An intervening corporate boundary obstructs visibility and communication and causes divergence of incentives... With offshoring, the distance is geographic. This increases the difficulty of moving materials, funds, information, knowledge, and workers." Accordingly, the outsourcing literature focuses on decentralized decision-making and the need for coordination (see the reviews by Elmaghraby 2000 and Cachon 2003 ), whereas we focus on how the geographic distance between an offshore supplier and an onshore market impacts a firm's operations.
At the core of our model is responsiveness, namely the ability to adjust inventory after receiving demand information updates. Therefore, our work is related to the literature on production management with demand updating. This literature can be loosely divided into two main categories.
The first category focuses on optimal responsiveness strategies and their benefits. For example, Fisher and Raman (1996) study how to dynamically allocate production capacity in response to information updates in a Quick Response system. Iyer and Bergen (1997) study the benefits of Quick Response in a manufacturer-retailer supply chain. Gurnani and Tang (1999) further consider optimal ordering policies with additional cost uncertainties under a similar setting. The second category revolves around the tradeoff between cost and responsiveness. Donohue (2000) studies efficient contract design with forecast updating between two production modes, one less costly and the other with a shorter lead-time. Two particularly related papers are by Wang et al. (2014) and Wu and Zhang (2014) , who, in the context of offshoring, study the interplay between cost, responsiveness, competition, and information. A commonality of these papers is that they all model two-tier supply chains each consisting of a manufacturer and a market, without considering suppliers. By contrast, we focus on OSD and explicitly model a three-tier supply chain consisting of an offshore supplier, a manufacturer, and an onshore market. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the first to do so in the study of reshoring.
Our problem is related to the newsvendor network design literature. Van Mieghem and Rudi (2002) offer an excellent review of this literature; here we focus on the two most relevant papers by Lu and Van Mieghem (2009) and Dong et al. (2010) . Their basic setting can be described as that a firm sells a product in two separate markets, and needs to decide whether to build a centralized production facility for both markets or a dedicated facility in each market. In short, the focus is on placing a factory between two separate markets. Our reshoring problem under OSD, on the other hand, can be described as placing a factory between an offshore supplier and an onshore market. Also, the main tradeoff of Lu and Van Mieghem (2009) and Dong et al. (2010) is between risk-pooling benefits and production and shipping costs, whereas in our reshoring problem under OSD the decision is made balancing offshoring and reshoring's baseline-cost difference as well as their costs to adjust inventories upward and downward.
Finally, several papers have studied Quick Response and postponement in competitive environments, including Van Mieghem and Dada (1999) , Anand and Girotra (2007) , Goyal and Netessine (2007) , Caro and Martínez-de-Albéniz (2010), Wang et al. (2014) , and Wu and Zhang (2014) . As a first attempt to study OSD's impact on reshoring manufacturing, we restrict our attention to a monopolistic setting. The insights from our paper will serve as a stepping stone to understanding this problem in more complex settings such as competitive environments.
Model setup and formulation
Our main objective in this paper is to investigate the effect of OSD on offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons. To do so, we first introduce a two-stage information updating model, based on which we analyze and compare a manufacturer's optimal profits in different production modes (i.e., offshoring or reshoring). Specifically, we consider an expected-profit-maximizing manufacturer selling its product in an onshore market at exogenous retail price p. The demand for the product is a random variable Ψ with a normal distribution N (µ, σ). We assume that the standard deviation σ is known, but the mean µ can be µ H (High demand) with prior probability γ or µ L (Low demand) with prior probability 1 − γ. (In Section 5.3 we show that the main insights remain unchanged with a continuous demand prior distribution.) We assume that µ H > µ L σ, so that the probability of a negative demand is negligible, and define ∆ . = (µ H − µ L )/σ as a measure of the difference between high and low demands relative to the demand uncertainty. At the beginning of Stage 1, the manufacturer only knows γ but not the exact demand type (i.e., whether µ = µ H or µ L ). A large (small) γ means that the demand is more likely to be high (low), which we refer to as a high (low) demand prospect. After Stage 1, the manufacturer learns the demand type µ through a marketing event, which is incorporated in its Stage-2 decisions. The demand type revelation captures how a firm may learn additional demand information through market studies prior to the selling season.
In the above two-stage information updating model, offshoring and reshoring manufacturers face different production and shipping costs and decision-making scenarios. Below we introduce and formulate the production problem of an offshoring manufacturer, and that of a reshoring manufacturer under OSD. For benchmarking, we also formulate a reshoring manufacturer's problem ignoring OSD. The timelines of the three models are illustrated in Figure 1 .
Offshoring
An offshoring manufacturer sources components and produces goods offshore before shipping the goods onshore to satisfy demands ( Figure 1 Case (a)). At the beginning of Stage 1, the manufacturer sources components from an offshore supplier at unit cost c and produces one unit of finished good from one unit of the component in its offshore factory at regular production cost m 0 per unit (we use super/subscript 0 to denote offshoring). We assume that the supplier has no capacity limit or order lead-time, and the regular production lasts through Stage 1. After Stage 1, the manufacturer learns the demand type (high or low).
At the beginning of Stage 2, if necessary, the offshoring manufacturer resorts to rush production to increase its inventory on short notice with an associated cost premium of r per unit (in addition to the regular production cost m 0 ). It then insures and ships finished goods onshore at unit cost s g (we use subscript g to denote finished goods may choose to hold back shipping of some finished goods to save shipping costs. This is essentially the offshoring manufacturer adjusting the inventory downward in response to the demand update (whereas it can also adjust the inventory upward using rush production).
In addition, an offshoring manufacturer needs to pay customs duties on imported finished goods.
We denote the duty rate for finished goods by t g as a fraction of the cost base. There are two 
is the optimal profit due to adjusting inventory after learning the mean demand µ (= µ H or µ L ), given the regular production quantity x 0 m :
The full analysis of (1)- (2) and optimal profit expressions can be found in Online Appendix A;
here we only briefly describe the result. Depending on ∆(= (µ H − µ L )/σ) and γ (the prior probability of a high demand), the manufacturer may play three different strategies. With a sufficiently small ∆, the manufacturer does not adjust inventory upon learning the demand type because the value cannot justify the cost of such adjustments. When ∆ is larger, the manufacturer may adjust inventory upon learning the demand type. With a low demand prospect (small γ), the manufacturer plans the initial production quantity anticipating a low demand, and makes an upward adjustment using rush production in the event that the demand turns out to be high. With a high demand prospect (large γ), the manufacturer plans the initial production quantity anticipating a high demand, and makes a downward adjustment by holding back shipping finished goods onshore in the event that the demand turns out to be low.
Reshoring under OSD
A reshoring manufacturer under OSD must source components from an offshore supplier even though production takes place onshore (Figure 1 Case (b)). At the beginning of Stage 1, the manufacturer sources components from an offshore supplier at unit cost c and ships the components onshore at unit cost s c (we use subscript c to denote components). Shipping lasts through Stage 1. After Stage 1, the manufacturer learns the demand type.
At the beginning of Stage 2, if necessary, the reshoring manufacturer resorts to expedited shipping to increase its component inventory on short notice with an associated cost premium of e per unit (in addition to the regular shipping cost s c ). It also needs to pay customs duties on imported components. We denote the duty rate for components by t c (recall that under CIF customs duties are not levied on shipping costs s c or e). The manufacturer then processes available components into finished goods in its onshore factory at unit cost m 1 (we use super/subscript 1 to denote reshoring).
Production lasts through Stage 2 and the goods are ready just in time for the selling season when demand is realized. Note that if the demand update after Stage 1 reveals a lower demand than the manufacturer has initially sourced components for, it may choose to hold back processing some available components into finished goods to save production costs. This is essentially the reshoring manufacturer adjusting the inventory downward in response to the demand update (whereas that it can also adjust the inventory upward using expedited shipping). Since the production decision is made after the demand update, no rush production is needed onshore. The formulation of the reshoring manufacturer's problem is
where
is the optimal profit due to adjusting the final inventory level after learning the mean demand µ (= µ H or µ L ), given the component purchase quantity
The full analysis of (3)- (4) and optimal profit expressions can be found in Online Appendix A.
Depending on ∆ and γ, the manufacturer may play three different strategies. With a sufficiently small ∆, the manufacturer does not adjust inventory upon learning the demand type. When ∆ is larger, the manufacturer may adjust inventory upon learning the demand type. With a low demand prospect (small γ), the manufacturer plans the initial component purchase quantity anticipating a low demand, and makes an upward adjustment using expedited shipping in the event that the demand turns out to be high. With a high demand prospect (large γ), the manufacturer plans the initial component purchase quantity anticipating a high demand, and makes a downward adjustment by holding back processing components into finished goods in the event that the demand turns out to be low. As one can see, a reshoring manufacturer's problem and optimal strategies under OSD are structurally similar to those of an offshoring manufacturer.
Benchmark: reshoring ignoring OSD
In order to demonstrate the effect of OSD on reshoring, we also analyze a benchmark reshoring model ignoring OSD, namely a reshoring manufacturer can source locally (onshore) for required components ( Figure 1 Case (c)). In other words, the reshoring manufacturer has unlimited access to onshore component supply with no lead-time at the beginning of Stage 2, and can make an integrated component purchase and production decision after learning the demand type. Clearly, depending on the realized demand type, the manufacturer faces one of two simple newsvendor problems. Specifically, given the mean demand µ, it is easy to show that the manufacturer's Stage-2 optimal profit has the following expression (throughout this paper we use Φ(·) and φ(·) to respectively denote the cumulative distribution function (CDF) and probability density function (PDF) of a standard normal distribution):
is the newsvendor critical ratio. Consequently, the manufacturer's
Stage-1 ex ante optimal profit in this benchmark case is simply
The above reshoring model ignoring OSD has a two-tier (manufacturer-market) supply chain structure, which has been commonly adopted in the literature (e.g., Wang et al. 2014, Wu and Zhang 2014) . By contrast, accounting for OSD necessitates a three-tier (supplier-manufacturermarket) reshoring model as described in Section 3.2 and illustrated in Figure 1 Case (b). In the next section we will demonstrate how OSD alters offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons.
The effect of offshore supply dependence
In this The current industry reality is that, without considering issues such as responsiveness, offshoring has equal or lower "baseline-costs" than reshoring. In our model, the baseline-costs, i.e., the unit costs of goods sold without responding to demand information updates, are (c + m 0 )(1 + t g ) + s g under offshoring and c(1 + t c ) + s c + m 1 under reshoring. Accordingly, we assume (c + m 0 )(1 +
comparisons. It is worth noting that our approach to the comparisons does not depend on this assumption, and can be easily extended to the case of δ < 0.
Benchmark: offshoring-reshoring comparison ignoring OSD
Utilizing the expected profit expressions of (1) and (5), we obtain the following proposition. ( . For any γ ≥ γ B , reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring. For any 0 < γ < γ B , there exists ∆ * B (γ) such that reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring if and only if ∆ > ∆ * B (γ). In particular, if δ = 0, reshoring always yields higher profits than offshoring.
The offshoring-reshoring profit comparison ignoring OSD reveals a basic baseline-cost versus responsiveness tradeoff. Specifically, offshoring has a baseline-cost advantage over reshoring, namely offshoring without adjusting inventory after learning the demand type is cheaper than reshoring.
On the other hand, reshoring has a responsiveness advantage over offshoring: if one ignores OSD, then a reshoring manufacturer can postpone all decisions until after learning the demand type, whereas an offshoring manufacturer has to make its regular production decision before learning the demand type (see Figure 1 Cases (a) and (c) When offshoring has a baseline-cost advantage (δ > 0), the outcome of the tradeoff depends on the demand prior parameters ∆ and γ (see Figure 2 for an illustration). With small ∆ (high and low mean demands being close) or γ close to 0 or 1 (mostly predictable demand type), reshoring's responsiveness has little value, thus offshoring yields higher profits than reshoring. In particular, a threshold γ B related to offshoring's baseline-cost advantage δ exists such that for γ > γ B , offshoring's baseline-cost advantage dominates reshoring's responsiveness advantage, and offshoring yields higher profits than reshoring for any ∆; as δ diminishes, the threshold γ B approaches 1. On the other hand, with moderate γ and sufficiently large ∆, reshoring's responsiveness has significant value and reshoring yields higher profits.
Offshoring-reshoring comparison under OSD
As we showed earlier, when considering OSD, a reshoring manufacturer's model has a three-tier (supplier-manufacturer-market) supply chain structure instead of a two-tier (manufacturer-market) structure when OSD is ignored. The manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits accordingly differ as well. Utilizing the expected profit expressions of (1) and (3), we obtain the following proposition.
The full analysis and the detailed version of this proposition are found in Online Appendix A as Propositions A3-A4.
Proposition 2. Suppose δ ≥ 0 and consider OSD.
(a) If e ≤ (1 + t g )r − δ, there exists a threshold γ ≤ γ B . For any γ ≥ γ, reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring. For any 0 < γ < γ, there exists ∆ * (γ) ≥ ∆ * B (γ) such that reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring if and only if ∆ > ∆ * (γ).
, there exist two thresholds γ < γ ≤ γ B .
For any γ ≤ γ or γ ≥ γ, reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring. For any γ < γ < γ, there exists ∆ * (γ) ≥ ∆ * B (γ) such that reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring if and only if
, reshoring always yields lower profits than offshoring.
The three cases of Proposition 2 are illustrated in Figure 3 . The same cases (parameters) with OSD ignored (as in Section 4.1 and Proposition 1) are also illustrated for comparison. Clearly, accounting for OSD results in much smaller parameter regions where reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring. This is expected; on a high level, OSD constrains a reshoring manufacturer's operational flexibility and hampers its responsiveness. However, to fully understand how exactly OSD leads to such changes, we need to carefully examine and compare the tradeoffs a manufacturer faces between offshoring and reshoring with or without OSD. In Section 4.1 we pointed out that, when ignoring OSD, the offshoring-reshoring comparison boils down to a basic tradeoff between offshoring's baseline-cost advantage and reshoring's responsiveness advantage, the latter due to that a reshoring manufacturer postpones all decisions until after learning the demand type whereas an offshoring manufacturer has to make the regular production decision before learning the demand type. Under OSD, however, reshoring no longer enjoys the same level of responsiveness (see Figure 1 Case (b)). Because of the component shipping leadtime from the offshore supplier, a reshoring manufacturer needs to make the component purchase decision before learning the demand type. In fact, our analyses in Sections 3.1 and 3.2 reveal that a reshoring manufacturer under OSD faces decision-making scenarios similar to those of an offshoring manufacturer: the reshoring manufacturer needs to make the component purchase decision (corresponding to the regular production decision under offshoring) in Stage 1 before learning the demand type; in Stage 2 after learning the demand type, the manufacturer can respond to it by adjusting its inventory upward by expedited shipping (corresponding to rush production under offshoring) or downward by holding back production (corresponding to holding back shipping of finished goods under offshoring). In short, OSD hampers a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness and forces the manufacturer to face a two-stage decision problem similar to that under offshoring.
As a result, the costs of inventory adjustments after learning the demand type determine reshoring's responsiveness under OSD. The unit upward and downward-adjustment costs introduced by OSD are the expedited shipping cost e and the discarded component cost (1 + t c )c + s c , respectively. (By comparison, a reshoring manufacturer without OSD postpones component purchases until after learning the demand type, which is equivalent to having zero upward and downward-adjustment costs.) When the expedited shipping cost (upward-adjustment cost) is relatively low (e ≤ (1 + t g )r − δ, Proposition 1 Case (a)), the offshoring-reshoring comparison retains the same structure as when OSD is ignored, with a shrinking reshoring region as one would expect (see Figure 3 Case (a)). When the expedited shipping cost is relatively high (e > (1 + t g )r − δ), however, accounting for OSD begins to alter the structure of the offshoring-reshoring comparison. In cases where the discarded component cost (downward-adjustment cost) are relatively low
, Proposition 1 Case (b)), the reshoring region further shrinks, and a new threshold γ emerges such that offshoring dominates reshoring for any γ ≤ γ (see Figure   3 Case (b)). This is because low demand prospects (small γ) require more often upward inventory adjustments, and reshoring's high expedited shipping cost (upward-adjustment cost) leads to offshoring dominating reshoring under OSD in this region. If the discarded component cost also
), the reshoring region completely vanishes under OSD, yielding the most striking contrast to when OSD is ignored (see Figure 3 Case (c)). In this case, reshoring's upward and downward adjustments are both costly, which completely wipe out reshoring's responsiveness advantage over offshoring. In fact, in today's environment where offshoring's baseline-cost advantage δ is relatively large and/or the offshoring's rush production premium r is relatively small (see Section 1), the conditions for Proposition 2 Case (c) are likely to hold. Clearly, failing to account for OSD in this case may lead to misguided favorable predictions about reshoring, while offshoring actually completely dominates reshoring under OSD. The distinction in the offshoring-reshoring comparison with and without OSD is even more evident in the special case where offshoring's baseline-cost advantages approaches zero (a full analysis and complete characterization of this special case are included in Online Appendix A as Proposition A5). Ignoring OSD would predict that reshoring dominates offshoring due to the former's responsiveness advantage (Proposition 1). By contrast, accounting for OSD yields drastically different outcomes. To illustrate, we provide two examples accounting for OSD in Figure 4 . In these examples, we choose parameters such that the baseline-cost difference δ = 0, thus for small ∆ where the manufacturer does not adjust inventory after learning the demand type it is indifferent between offshoring and reshoring. We separate the indifferent and offshoring regions with dotted lines to indicate that the indifferent regions will merge into the offshoring regions for an arbitrar- To summarize, when ignoring OSD, one would conclude that because a reshoring manufacturer can postpone production (without being constrained by component supplies), reshoring always has a responsiveness advantage over offshoring, and the only way offshoring may be preferable is when it possesses a baseline-cost advantage. Our analysis however shows that, when accounting for OSD, although a reshoring manufacturer can postpone production, it cannot postpone component purchases, which makes the manufacturer's inventory adjustments in response to demand updates costly (like under offshoring). These costs determine whether reshoring has a responsiveness advantage over offshoring. When the costs are relatively small, the offshoring-reshoring comparison under OSD behaves similarly to that in the case ignoring OSD; however, when the costs are relatively large (as is often the case in practice), OSD substantially changes the outcome of the comparison, and offshoring may dominate reshoring even when the former has no baseline-cost advantage. This signifies the importance of taking into account OSD for a manufacturer considering reshoring, as failing to do so may lead to misguided profitability predictions.
Further discussions
In this section we offer additional discussions and robustness checks about offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons under OSD.
Customs duties and shipping costs
Both offshoring and reshoring under OSD involve cross-border transactions. Below we analyze the impacts of salient costs of cross-border transactions, such as customs duties and shipping costs, on offshoring-reshoring comparisons under OSD. For Propositions 2 Cases (a) and (b), conducting sensitivity analysis on ∆ * (γ) is intractable, so we resort to analyzing the sensitivity of the limit thresholds to gain insights in the next proposition. The proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 3. Suppose δ ≥ 0 and consider OSD.
(1) In Proposition 2 Case (a), γ is decreasing in t c and s c and increasing in t g and s g .
(2) In Proposition 2 Case (b), γ is decreasing in t c and s c and increasing in t g and s g , and γ is increasing in t c and s c and decreasing in t g and s g . (1) and (2), although the proposition shows this trend for limit thresholds, we numerically verify that the same trend holds in general.) This trend is intuitive, as a reshoring manufacturer needs to incur customs duties and shipping costs for components, whereas an offshoring manufacturer needs to incur those costs for finished goods.
We further note that customs duties and shipping costs of finished goods and components often of such scenarios is that customs duties and shipping costs of finished goods and components move in the same direction, thus the cost differences between finished goods and components tend to change much less than the costs themselves. To understand the impacts of such correlated changes in customs duties and shipping costs of both finished goods and components, we approximate the scenarios by fixing t g − t c and s g − s c , and investigate the threshold limits' sensitivity with respect to changes in t c and s c in the next proposition. The proof is straightforward and thus omitted.
Proposition 4. Suppose δ ≥ 0 and consider OSD. Set t g ≡ t c + t δ and s g ≡ s c + s δ , where t δ and s δ are kept constant.
(1) In Proposition 2 Case (a), γ may be increasing or decreasing in t c , but is decreasing in s c .
(2) In Proposition 2 Case (b), γ may be increasing or decreasing in t c , but is decreasing in s c ; γ may be increasing or decreasing in t c , but is increasing in s c .
(3) Between Proposition 2 Cases (b) and (c), Case (c) where offshoring dominates reshoring may become less likely as t c increases or decreases, but will become less likely as s c decreases.
Proposition 4 suggests that when customs duties for both finished goods and components increase in a correlated manner, their influence on the offshoring-reshoring profit comparison may go either way. This ambiguity is more nuanced than popular arguments, such as that TPP would stall the reshoring movement (Semuels 2015, Nash-Hoff 2015), or that Brexit may help reshoring gain more traction (Kondej 2016) . A more careful inspection of these popular arguments reveal that they are mainly based on how tariffs impact imported finished goods without considering similar impacts on imported materials and components, which are not negligible under OSD. Our inconclusive sensitivity analysis suggests that, under OSD, the impact of trade treaties such as TPP or movements such as Brexit on reshoring manufacturing may be more subtle than one's first intuition, and begs for more thorough investigations.
On the other hand, when shipping costs for both finished goods and components increase in a correlated manner, Proposition 4 suggests that reshoring may become less appealing or even dominated when compared with offshoring (in Cases (1) and (2), although the proposition shows this trend for limit thresholds, we numerically verify that the same trend holds in general). The intuition is as follows. Under offshoring, production takes place before shipping (of finished goods), whereas under reshoring with OSD, shipping (of components) takes place before production. Therefore, when shipping costs increase, offshoring gains additional advantage over reshoring (with OSD) due to its ability to make the shipping decision after learning more accurate demand information.
Mitigating measure
We have shown that OSD hampers a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness. In the long run, onshore supply bases may gradually grow, relieving reshoring manufacturers' dependence on offshore suppliers. However, onshore suppliers are unlikely to rapidly develop before reshoring reaches a critical mass, whereas large-scale reshoring is unlikely to take place before onshore supply bases become full-fledged, creating a chicken-and-egg dilemma. Until this dilemma is resolved, manufacturers under OSD will continue to face the problem of remaining offshore to be close to their suppliers versus reshoring to be close to their markets. Under this circumstance, mitigating measures that can make reshoring more appealing under OSD would be highly valuable, as they can help resolve the dilemma and accelerate reshoring as well as onshore supply base development.
We argue that common-component designs is one such mitigating measure. To elaborate this idea, consider the following modifications to the offshoring model and reshoring model under OSD.
Suppose now the manufacturer makes two different products a and b for the onshore market, which require separate manufacturing processes, but share a component sourced from an offshore supplier.
Suppose their demand type priors are not perfectly correlated. Figure 5 illustrates the sequence of events with common-component designs. 
Figure 5 Sequence of events with a common-component design
This modification has different implications for the manufacturer under offshoring and reshoring.
Under offshoring, the two products are manufactured separately from the very beginning. As a result, common-component designs do not affect the base model's optimal strategy or profit. By contrast, under reshoring, the manufacturer sources components for both products in Stage 1 and allocates the components between them in Stage 2 after learning each product's demand type, which improves its responsiveness. As a result, the profit comparison is shifted in favor of reshoring.
It is straightforward to prove this conclusion, which we do not include in the paper for brevity.
To summarize, common-component designs make reshoring more appealing under OSD, thus is a potential approach to break the dilemma between reshoring manufacturing and onshore supply base development. At its core, this approach resembles delayed product differentiation (Lee and Tang 1997) in that it improves reshoring's responsiveness through the well-known inventory pooling effect, but also notably does not generate similar pooling benefits under offshoring.
Robustness check: continuous demand prior
For tractability, we have assumed a two-point distribution for the mean demand prior in our analyses. It is important to confirm that the offshoring-reshoring comparison structure depicted in Figure 3 is not driven by this specific demand prior distribution. To do so, we modify the offshoring model (1)-(2) and the reshoring model under OSD (3)-(4) by replacing the two-point mean demand prior distribution with a continuous beta distribution.
Recall that in the original model, the mean demand prior µ may be µ H with probability γ and µ L with probability 1 − γ, where ∆ = (µ H − µ L )/σ captures the normalized range. To capture similar demand features, we consider a shifted and scaled beta distribution for the mean demand prior; i.e., we assume µ .
distribution with α ∈ (0, 2). A Beta(α, 2 − α) distribution has support (0, 1); for α ∈ (0, 1) its PDF is decreasing from ∞ to 0, and for α ∈ (1, 2) its PDF is increasing from 0 to ∞. When α = 1, the beta distribution reduces to a Uniform(0,1) distribution. Hence, small α (close to 0) values imply that demands are more likely to be low, whereas large α values (close to 2) imply that demands are more likely to be high. Clearly, this beta prior distribution is a continuous generalization of the original two-point distribution; in particular, the parameter ∆ = (µ H − µ L )/σ serves the same role, and the parameter α ∈ (0, 2) serves a similar role as the original γ ∈ (0, 1). The modifications to the formulations involve simply replacing the two-point distribution expectations in (1) and (3) with beta distribution expectations and are omitted. We numerically evaluate the modified models and find that the basic structure under OSD in Figure 3 are preserved with the beta prior.
One example is provided in Figure 6 with the x-axis representing ∆ and the y-axis representing α ∈ (0, 2), generated with the same cost parameters as Figure 3 Case (a). 
Robustness check: instantaneous response after demand realization
In our main models, we assumed that rush production or expedited shipping are not fast enough to satisfy unmet demands after demand realization. We made this assumption to stay true to the newsvendor framework, which models scenarios where the selling season is much shorter than the production or shipping lead-times, such that the selling season is modeled as being instantaneous.
It also ensures that our model is consistent with the literature (Fisher and Raman 1996) First consider an offshoring manufacturer. Let e denote the cost premium associated with expedited shipping of finished goods to satisfy unmet realized demands. With this change, the offshoring problem (1) and (2) become
The last term in Π 0 s (µ, x 0 m ) captures the potential profit generated by expediting held-back finished goods to satisfy unmet realized demands. When e is sufficiently large, i.e., e ≥ p − t g (c + m 0 ) − s g , the last term becomes zero and the formulation is reduced to (1) and (2).
Similarly, consider a reshoring manufacturer under OSD. Let r denote the cost premium associated with onshore rush production of shipped components to satisfy unmet realized demands.
With this change, the reshoring problem (3) and (4) become
The last term in Π 1 m (µ, x 0 m ) captures the potential profit generated by rush-producing finished goods from held-back components to satisfy unmet realized demands. When r is sufficiently large, i.e., r ≥ p − m 1 , the last term becomes zero and the formulation is reduced to (3) and (4).
Allowing for instantaneous responses after demand realization implies that the manufacturer can respond to two demand information updates, which complicates the problems significantly and renders them analytically intractable (see Online Appendix A for details). We thus resort to numerical evaluations. Figure 7 contains nine cases for comparison. All previously existing parameters are kept identical to Figure 3 Case (a). The two new parameters are e (expedited shipping premium under offshoring) and r (onshore rush production premium). Three representatives values ranging from high (H) to medium (M ) to low (L) are evaluated for each of the two new parameters, with H high enough such that the manufacturer would never use instantaneous responses after demand realization and the problems are reduced to their counterparts in Section 3. Consistent with Figure   3 , the x-and y-axes are respectively ∆ ∈ [0, 10] and γ ∈ [0, 1]. We omit the axis labels to save space.
A few observations are immediate from Figure 7 . First, offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons with instantaneous responses after demand realization remain structurally similar to those without instantaneous responses. Second, a lower e (expedited shipping premium under offshoring) favors offshoring, and a lower r (onshore rush production premium) favors reshoring, which are intuitive.
The two effects can also offset each other; for example, the case of e = L, r = L is qualitatively similar to the case of e = H, r = H. In general, our investigation confirms that the results from the original models are robust with instantaneous responses after demand realization.
Concluding remarks
In this paper, we rigorously model and investigate the issue of offshore supply dependence (OSD) and its effect on reshoring manufacturing. We build our models around the key notion that, under OSD, reshoring reduces a manufacturer's distance to the market at the expense of increasing its distance to the supplier. We find that the increased distance to the supplier and the resulting component shipping lead-time hamper a reshoring manufacturer's responsiveness to demand information updates. Specifically, under OSD, the reshoring manufacturer still has to make the component purchase decision based on early, less accurate demand information, which limits its ability to take advantage of more accurate demand information in the postponed onshore production decision. This effect of OSD reshapes the cost-responsiveness tradeoff between offshoring and reshoring and significantly affects offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons. Therefore, ignoring OSD may exaggerate reshoring's responsiveness advantage, leading to misguided favorable predictions about reshoring, while in fact the opposite may be true should OSD be properly accounted for. Consequently, OSD deserves careful attention of relevant stakeholders in the consideration of reshoring. In fact, the recent empirical study by Cohen et al. (2016) finds that firms which choose to reshore tend to have less concerns about supply-related factors including supply availability and raw material and logistics costs, which is consistent with our model predictions.
Our models also capture salient costs of cross-border transactions such as different customs duties and shipping costs for finished goods and components. This allows us to investigate how these costs influence offshoring-reshoring profit comparisons under OSD. We find that trade treaties or protectionist movements that increase or decrease customs duties in a correlated manner may or may not make reshoring more appealing, and that increased shipping costs for both finished goods and components may actually make reshoring less appealing when compared with offshoring. Both observations are more nuanced than the common notions formed without accounting for OSD, signifying the importance of OSD when comparing offshoring and reshoring.
By rigorously modeling OSD and showing its importance in the reshoring consideration, our work provides a theoretical support for many practitioners' views on this issue; e.g., Shih (2014) summarizes, "the big picture is shifting away from the centrality of labor-cost arbitrage as a driver of location decisions. Instead, it is moving to the supplier ecosystems as a key complementary asset." To this end, we recommend the near-term approach of common-component designs to make reshoring more appealing under OSD. In the long run, we believe that fostering onshore supply base development will be key to creating a viable environment for sustainable and scalable reshoring. Now consider the manufacturer's decision after learning the demand type. Suppose that the manufacturer adjusts the final inventory level downward when demand is high, then it must also adjust the final inventory level downward when demand is low. Such a strategy cannot be optimal as one can improve it by simply reducing the initial production quantity. Hence, in the event that the demand type is revealed to be high, the manufacturer would either adjust the final inventory level upward or do nothing, and the resulting profit function is
The above problem is a standard newsvendor problem. We define z Similarly, the manufacturer would either adjust production downward or do nothing in the event that the demand type is revealed to be low, and the resulting profit function is
We define z
which is the critical fractile for the downward adjustment 
It is also useful to define the following two thresholds for γ:
The following lemma characterizes these two thresholds (all proofs are in Appendix B):
For ease of exposition, we define two more critical fractiles:
where it can be shown that z 
where it can be shown that z 0 mD decreases from z to z 0 U as γ decreases from 1 to γ 0 . The next proposition characterizes an offshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits.
Proposition A1. The offshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits are as follows:
. In other words, the manufacturer makes neither upward nor downward adjustments. The optimal profit is −(
In other words, the manufacturer makes an upward adjustment if the demand turns out to be high. The optimal profit is pσγΦ(z
In other words, the manufacturer makes a downward adjustment if the demand turns out to be low. The optimal profit is pσγΦ(z
Reshoring analysis under OSD
Similar to the offshoring model, we define
Due to the different timelines, these expressions do not exactly mirror the offshoring expressions, however similar analysis could still be carried out, which leads to the following lemma that mirrors Lemma A1 for the offshoring model. The proof is similar to that of Lemma A1 and is thus omitted.
We define two more critical fractiles:
where it can be shown that z 1 cU increases from z to z 1 D as γ increases from 0 to γ 1 ; and
where it can be shown that z 1 cD decreases from z to z 1 U as γ decreases from 1 to γ 1 . The next proposition characterizes a reshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits. The proof is structurally similar to that of Proposition A1 and is thus omitted.
Proposition A2. The reshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits are as follows:
. In other words, the manufacturer makes neither upward nor downward adjustments. The optimal profit is −((1
Offshoring-reshoring profit comparison under OSD
We define b 0 = (1 + t g )(c + m 0 ) + s g , b 1 = (1 + t c )c + s c + m 1 to be the baseline-costs (without adjusting inventory after learning the demand type), u 0 = (1 + t g )r, u 1 = e to be the cost of a unit upward inventory adjustment, and d 0 = c + m 0 , d 1 = (1 + t c )c + s c to be the cost of a unit downward inventory adjustment, of offshoring and reshoring respectively. We then rewrite all z terms:
The following useful lemma is straightforward to verify, thus we omit the proof.
Lemma A3. Below are the Π terms' derivatives with respect to ∆ and the conditions for their comparisons:
We then present the complete versions of Propositions 2 as Propositions A3 and A4. The proofs are in Appendix B.
where γ ≤ γ B . For any γ ≥ γ, reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring. For any 0 < γ < γ, there exists ∆ * (γ) ≥ ∆ * B (γ) such that reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring if and only if
For any γ ≤ γ or γ ≥ γ, reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring. For any γ < γ < γ, there exists (a) When m ≤ s and r ≤ e, reshoring always yields lower profits than offshoring.
(b) When m > s and r > e, reshoring always yields higher profits than offshoring.
(c) When m > s and r ≤ e, thresholds γ
).
•
, reshoring and offshoring yield equal profits.
• If ∆ ≤ ∆ * and γ < γ 0 U (∆), or ∆ > ∆ * and γ ≤ γ * , reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring.
• If ∆ ≤ ∆ * and γ > γ 
• If ∆ ≤ ∆ † and γ < γ 1 U (∆), or ∆ > ∆ † and γ ≤ γ † , reshoring yields higher profits than offshoring.
• If ∆ ≤ ∆ † and γ > γ 0 D (∆), or ∆ > ∆ † and γ > γ † , reshoring yields lower profits than offshoring.
Offshoring analysis with instantaneous responses
The offshoring formulation with instantaneous responses after demand realization is
If the manufacturer uses rush production (which implies no holding back shipping of finished goods) after the Stage 1 demand information update, the Stage 2 formulation is
If the manufacturer holds back shipping of finished goods (which implies no rush production) or do nothing after the Stage 1 demand information update, the Stage 2 formulation is
The last equation is due to the relationship that
The above closed-form formulations are then numerically evaluated to solve for the offshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits.
Reshoring analysis under OSD with instantaneous responses
The reshoring formulation with instantaneous responses after demand realization is
If the manufacturer expedites components (which implies no holding back production) after the Stage 1 demand information update, the Stage 2 formulation is
If the manufacturer holds back production (which implies no expedited components) or do nothing after the Stage 1 demand information update, the Stage 2 formulation is
The derivation is similar to the offshoring case. The above closed-form formulations are then numerically evaluated to solve for the reshoring manufacturer's optimal strategies and profits, and comparing the offshoring and reshoring optimal profits yields Figure 7.
Appendix B: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. The general result with δ ≥ 0 follows from Propositions A3 with e = 0 (ignoring OSD is equivalent to having free expedited shipping). The special result with δ = 0 follows from the argument that a reshoring manufacturer can replicate any offshoring production quantity at no higher costs.
Proof of Proposition 2. Case (a) follows from Proposition A3. Cases (b) and (c) follow from Proposition A4.
Proof of Lemma A1. By (A3), it is straightforward to verify that γ 
which is the same as the threshold γ
which is the same as the threshold γ 0 D (∆) defined in (A3). Therefore, we conclude that µ H + σz
Proof of Proposition A1. We first introduce a relation that follows straightforward integration by parts. Recall that Φ and φ denote the standard normal cumulative distribution and probability density functions, respectively. Suppose Ψ follows a normal distribution with mean µ and standard deviation σ. Then 
hence it is optimal for the manufacturer to adjust the final inventory level upward to µ H + σz 0 U if the demand type turns out to be high and do nothing if it turns out to be low. The problem becomes the following: 
Now consider the subcase of ∆ > ∆ 0 and γ 
Proof of Proposition A3. We show the proof in four parts. First we show that the manufacturer prefers to remain offshoring for sufficiently small ∆. Second we show the manufacturer's limit preference for sufficiently large ∆. Third we show that if the manufacturer's preference for ∆ → 0 and ∆ → ∞ differs, then as ∆ increases, the manufacturer's preference changes exactly once. Finally we show that if the manufacturer's preference for ∆ → 0 and ∆ → ∞ is the same, then as ∆ increases, the manufacturer's preference never changes.
We use short-hand notations Π i X (∆, γ) to denote the offshoring (i = 0) or reshoring (i = 1) manufacturer's profit expressions in the three cases (X = N, U, D) presented in Propositions A1 and
We also denote the inverse functions of γ
, both offshoring and reshoring are in Case N , namely the manufacturer uses neither flexibility regardless of the demand type. Since b 0 ≤ b 1 , in this case an offshoring manufacturer could mimic the reshoring strategy at no higher costs and receive the same revenue, thus the manufacturer prefers to remain offshoring.
II. When ∆ → ∞, each of offshoring and reshoring will be either in Case U or Case D, and the Π terms' derivatives with respect to ∆ determine the limit profit comparisons. The conditions in the proposition follow straightforwardly from Lemma A3.
III.
We make an important observation that for any γ, the manufacturer's profit is concave in ∆. Using this property, we show that if the manufacturer's preference for ∆ → 0 and ∆ → ∞ differs, then as ∆ increases, the manufacturer's preference changes exactly once. When both offshoring and reshoring are in Case N , we know that the manufacturer's preference does not change in ∆.
We already know in Cases
When one production mode is out of Case N , for example offshoring is in Case U , then Π and ∆ * (γ) ≥ ∆ * B (γ) are due to the following argument: a reshoring manufacturer ignoring OSD can always replicate the optimal decisions of a reshoring manufacturer under OSD at no higher costs, and that an offshoring manufacturer's profit is not affected by OSD, thus accounting for OSD reduces the reshoring region.
Proof of Proposition A5. Cases (a) follows from the fact that m ≤ s and r ≤ e respectively ensure that reshoring has higher downward and upward inventory adjustment costs than offshoring.
Cases (b) follows from the fact that m > s and r > e respectively ensure that reshoring has lower downward and upward inventory adjustment costs than offshoring. In Case (c) we have m > s and r ≤ e. Due to Lemmas A1 and A2, we know that γ U (∆). In Scenario 1), due to Propositions A1 and A2, we know that if the demand type turns out to be high, an offshoring manufacturer would adjust the final inventory level upward, but a reshoring manufacturer would do nothing. Because an offshoring manufacturer always has the option of doing nothing, offshoring must yield higher profits than reshoring. In Scenario 2), due to Propositions A1 and A2, we know that if the demand type turns out to be high, both an offshoring and a reshoring manufacturer would adjust the final inventory level upward, which incurs r per unit under offshoring and e per unit under reshoring. Since r ≤ e, offshoring yields higher profits than reshoring. Therefore, the manufacturer prefers to remain offshoring in this subcase.
The second subcase is ∆ > ∆ * and γ ≤ γ * . Recall that γ 1 < γ * < γ 0 . Due to Proposition A1, we know that an offshoring manufacturer would adjust the final inventory level upward if the demand type turns out to be high. On the other hand, due to Proposition A2, a reshoring manufacturer may do nothing, adjust the final inventory level upward if the demand type turns out to be high, or adjust the final inventory level downward if it turns out to be low. When a reshoring manufacturer does nothing or adjusts the final inventory level upward if the demand type turns out to be high, offshoring yields higher profits than reshoring following similar arguments as the first subcase.
It remains to compare offshoring and reshoring profits with ∆ > ∆ * and max{γ where γ * = (c + s)/(c + s + r), the above expression is strictly increasing in ∆. Define∆ as the solution to γ 1 D (∆) = γ . We know that at the point (∆, γ ), the reshoring manufacturer would do nothing regardless of the revealed demand type. Therefore, offshoring yields higher profits than reshoring. It then follows that offshoring yields strictly higher profits than reshoring for all ∆ >∆ and γ ∈ (max{γ 1 D (∆), γ 1 }, γ * ). Combining the above cases, we conclude that the manufacturer prefers to remain offshoring in Case 2.
This leaves Case 3: ∆ ≤ ∆ * and γ > γ
